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ABSTRACT: In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open. 
More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by open-
future-Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented 
in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. 
Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails to explain why 
we cannot bring about certain states of affairs, it cannot explain what I call the “recalcitrance of nature”. 
Keywords: Humeanism; laws; necessary connections; nomological necessity. 
RESUMEN: En este artículo presento un problema, al menos para aquellos humeanos que creen que el futuro está 
abierto. Argumentaré, en particular, que el siguiente aspecto de la práctica científica no puede ser explicado 
por la tesis humeana del futuro abierto: la distinción entre estados que no podemos provocar (representados 
en los modelos científicos como nomológicamente imposibles) y estados que simplemente no podemos 
generar. Dicha tesis no puede ofrecer un tratamiento convincente de esta distinción. Por ello fracasa al ex-
plicar por qué no podemos provocar ciertos estados de cosas; no puede explicar, pues, lo que denomino “la 
obstinación de la naturaleza”. 
Palabras clave: Humeana (filosofía); leyes; conexión necesaria; necesidad nomológica. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that 
the future is open (such views are considered in Backmann (2013), Beebee and Mele 
(2002) and Swartz (2003)). I will argue that some aspects of scientific practice cannot 
be explained by open-future-Humeanism. Some authors took the success of our prac-
tice of induction to indicate the existence of necessary connections between distinct 
events and thus the denial of Humeanism. I will briefly rehearse this unsuccessful at-
tempt for reasons of stage-setting. Afterwards, I will argue that the failure of certain 
manipulatory practices that are indicative of the recalcitrance of nature can best be ex-
plained in terms of necessary connections.   
 The context within which my argument is set is the debate between Humean and 
non-Humean conceptions of metaphysics of science. Humeans take as their starting 
point Hume’s observation that “All events seem entirely loose and separate” (Hume 
1975, 74). David Lewis has characterised Humeanism by what can be considered to-
day’s standard formulation: 
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It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, 
just one little thing and then another. [...] For short we have an arrangement of qualities. And that 
is all. (Lewis 1986, ix-x) 
 Humeanism implies that there are no necessary connections in nature between en-
tities that are wholly distinct. (Such connections would be an addition to the Humean 
mosaic). Non-Humeans believe that there are such connections. Necessary connec-
tions can be conceived of in various ways, for instance as metaphysically necessary 
connections or as connections such that one entity necessitates another entity. The 
question of the exact nature of necessary connections—if there are any—will be by-
passed in this paper.  
 In section 2, I will briefly rehearse arguments from our inductive practice to the 
existence of necessary connections. From section 3 onwards I will develop an inde-
pendent argument that is more difficult for the open-future-Humean to cope with be-
cause an analysis of what is going on merely in terms of regularities is not applicable in 
this case. 
2. The problem of Induction 
Predictions are part of our scientific practice. We often rely on laws when we predict. 
There are two different strategies to take this practice as being indicative of underlying 
necessary connections. According to the first strategy the postulation of necessary 
connections helps to reject inductive scepticism. David Armstrong has argued along 
these lines.1 Armstrong claims that “if laws of nature are nothing but Humean uni-
formities then inductive scepticism is inevitable” (Armstrong 1983, 52). However: 
I believe the Universals theory can do better. The postulation of a connection between universals 
can provide an explanation of an observed regularity in a way that postulating a Humean uni-
formity cannot. (Armstrong 1983, 104) 
Armstrong reconstructs inductive inferences as two-step processes and argues that 
both steps are innocuous. The first step is an inference to the best explanation. Ac-
cording to Armstrong being F has to be understood as instantiating the universal F-
ness and similarly for G-ness. The best explanation of the fact that all hitherto ob-
served Fs are Gs invokes a necessitating relation N(F,G) according to which F-ness 
brings about or necessitates G-ness. The second step consists in inferring from 
N(F,G) that all Fs are Gs (whether observed or not).  
 In order to be able to reject inductive scepticism alternative accounts of explaining 
why all hitherto observed Fs are Gs have to be ruled out. Helen Beebee has recently 
argued that Armstrong overlooks alternatives such as time-indexed necessity relations, 
                                                      
1 Similarly Brian Ellis holds: 
[Scientific essentialism] promises to transform our thinking about scientific rationality and the 
theory of inductive reasoning. If one believes, as Hume did, that all events are loose and separate, 
then the problem of induction is probably insoluble. Anything could happen. But if one thinks, as 
scientific essentialists do, that the laws of nature are immanent in the world, and depend on the 
essential natures of things, then there are strong constraints on what could possibly happen. (Ellis 
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which—she claims—explain the correlations that have been observed so far equally 
well (Beebee 2011).  
 According to the second strategy necessary connections are needed to explain why 
our inductive practice is successful. Even though inductive scepticism cannot be 
countered, our inferences work. Prima facie this appears to be surprising given the 
world is as the Humean conceives of it: Suppose I prepare the coffee-machine for 
making a coffee. I put the powder into the filter and press the button. What is going 
to happen? Suppose that ultimately all there is is a Humean mosaic. Everything is 
loose and separate. There are no necessary connections between distinct events. So, 
what might happen? (i) The coffee-machine brews my coffee, (ii) the coffee-machine 
disappears, (iii) the coffee-machine explodes, (iv) the coffee-machine makes tea, and 
so on. On the simple Humean mosaic view it appears to be a miracle that it always 
brews coffee. Why didn’t the coffee-machine ever make tea? It seems that in the ab-
sence of necessary connections tea is as likely to be produced as coffee. By contrast, if 
there are necessary connections it is no miracle that every single time I start the cof-
fee-machine it fails to make tea. There are certain facts that necessitate the brewing of 
the coffee. So, maybe we should argue that the best explanation of the fact that the 
coffee-machine fails to make tea after I put in the coffee-powder and I pressed the 
button is after all some kind of necessary connection. Leaving out some details and 
disregarding the option of time-indexed necessary connections we might argue that it 
is plausible that a time-less necessary connection is indeed the best explanation for 
why the coffee-maker fails to make tea.  
 Well, no. As Beebee points out (Beebee 2011, 525-6) the Humean has just as good 
an explanation as the non-Humean—at least if she additionally assumes regularity. Ac-
cording to this conception, what is underlying the world as we experience it is not just 
any Humean mosaic, but one that fulfils an additional constraint: it is regular. If the 
mosaic and a fortiori the world is regular that explains why the coffee-machine regularly 
fails to make tea. The introduction of the regularity-constraint may appear to be an ad 
hoc-manoeuvre because the regularity-constraint is solely motivated by what it is sup-
posed to explain. But, the Humean will argue, the non-Humean has no better argu-
ment for the assumption of time-less necessities.  
 The conclusion is thus, that the non-Humean inference to the best explanation with 
respect to the success of our inductive inferences does not work. It does not work be-
cause there appears to be an equally good explanation that appeals to the general fact 
that the world/the Humean mosaic is regular. (For a similar line of argument see 
Smart 2013.) 
 To conclude: Two strategies to argue from our inductive practices to the existence 
of necessary connections can be distinguished. The two strategies deal with different 
issues/questions: 
Issue 1: How can inductive scepticism be countered? Does the invocation of    
necessary connections allow us to meet the inductive sceptics standards?  
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Issue 2: Here it is taken for granted that our inductive practices are successful.   
The question is: What are the features of the world that best explain this 
success? 
 As we have seen, neither of these strategies provides a good argument for the ex-
istence of necessary connections in nature. 
3.  The Recalcitrance of Nature   
A belief in universal regularity might be sufficient to explain why we can rely on our 
inductive practices. I will now argue that there are further aspects of scientific practice 
that cannot be accommodated by this strategy.  
 Regularities are correlations between events. Something like this: “All events of 
type F are followed by events of type G.” But laws do not only tell us what as a matter 
fact happens—laws tell us furthermore what might happen and what cannot happen. 
This modal aspect plays an essential role in understanding how we intervene into the 
course of nature or fail to be able to do so. Intervention is tied to aspects of scientific 
practice that the Humean cannot fully explain. The best explanation of our interven-
tion- or manipulation-practice refers to necessary connections in nature. (Note: When 
I talk of intervention or manipulation in the context of this paper I do not have in 
mind a technical notion of intervention. What I have in mind is that we change the 
states of systems (often but not necessarily with the purpose of bringing about further 
changes elsewhere in the system).) 
 Let’s take the Boyle-Charles-Law pV=nkT as our paradigm case of a law. The law 
is idealized. However, taking less idealized laws for gases as our paradigm case—such 
as the van der Waals law or the Deiterici-equation—adds complications, e.g. further 
variables, without adding benefit for our discussion. The Boyle-Charles-law tells us 
that for every gas, if it has a certain value of pressure (p) and volume (V) there will be 
a definite value for temperature (T); (n and k are constants). The law describes how 
gases as a matter of fact behave. But that is not all. It also tells us how gases would be-
have if certain values of p and V were brought about. Thus, it states the nomologically 
possible behaviour of gases. Furthermore the law tells us which kind of behaviour is 
nomologically impossible: if a gas is prepared such that it has a certain pressure value and a 
certain volume, all but one value for temperature are impossible. The law forbids all 
other values. For this reason Popper conceived of laws as ‘prohibitions’ (Popper 1959, 
§15). This modal import of laws is essential to understand some aspects of our prac-
tice of intervention or manipulation.  
 We can successfully intervene into gases and bring about T0, e.g. by setting p to p0 
and V to V0. However, we cannot bring about T1 ≠ T0 by setting p to p0 and V to V0. 
It is impossible to do this, even if we try hard. We cannot bring it about that a gas has 
values for p, V and T that fail to stand in the relation stated by the Boyle-Charles law, 
whereas we can bring about value-combinations in accordance with it. Some attempts 
to bring about combinations of values for p, V and T are successful whereas others 
fail to be successful. 
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 The important thing is that it would be wrong to describe the situation as follows: 
It simply happens to be the case that all gases have p-V-T combinations in accordance 
with the Boyle-Charles law. Rather: even if we try to bring about other combinations it 
does not work. Nature is recalcitrant. 
 The recalcitrance of nature is of course an ubiquitous phenomenon. We cannot 
bring it about that a body that moves uniformly and with constant velocity if a non-
zero net force applies to it. We cannot bring about situations disallowed by the Max-
well-equations. And no matter how much money we spend on accelerators we cannot 
accelerate massive particles to a speed larger than the speed of light. That is of course 
what special relativity theory tells us. It does not tell us that as a matter of fact there are 
no massive particles with superluminal velocities. It tells us that it is impossible that 
there are such particles. It is part of the content of the law that certain situations are 
forbidden, i.e. impossible. What needs to be explained is why we persistently fail to 
bring about these situations even if we try hard. What is it that explains why we can-
not bring about certain states of affairs? What explains the difference between those 
situations that can be brought about and those that cannot? What explains why nature 
is recalcitrant—or at least appears to be recalcitrant? 
 Two different issues need to be distinguished here. The first issue is whether on 
the basis of past failed attempts to bring about a certain state we can conclude that all at-
tempts in the future will fail too. This is the question whether the modal sceptic’s cri-
teria can be met. Probably not. We cannot derive a “can’t” from a “not yet”. But as in 
the case of induction where the inductive sceptic’s criteria could not be met there is a 
second issue. It concerns the following question: Nature is or appears to be recalci-
trant. What are the features of the world that best explain why we cannot bring about 
those states disallowed by the laws? Within this second context/issue it is taken for 
granted that nature is or appears to be recalcitrant. Certain states cannot be brought 
about. The question is whether there is an explanation for this recalcitrance or impos-
sibility. 
 The non-Humean has an obvious explanation for why we can bring about certain 
situations but not others. Laws of nature describe what happens with (some sort of) 
necessity. If a gas has values p = p0 and V = V0 it is necessarily the case that T has the 
value T0. All other values are impossible.  
 Whether this is the best explanation depends on whether the Humean can explain 
(or explain away) exclusively in terms of regularity or other features of the Humean 
mosaic the recalcitrance of nature, i.e. the impossibility of bringing about situations 
forbidden by the law. I will now explore to what extent this strategy may work. 
4. The Humean’s option and its costs 
Why is it that we can bring about some combinations of pVT-values but not others? 
Why is it that we cannot accelerate particles beyond the speed of light? Why is there 
no perpetuum mobile? If we could build a perpetuum mobile that would certainly be 
of severe practical and economical interest. I will now explore the Humean’s option to 
explain the recalcitrance of nature. 
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 On the non-Humean view facts about the past and the present determine what can 
and what cannot happen. By contrast on a Humean view nothing is entailed by past 
and present facts. If all events are entirely loose and separate there is then nothing that 
explains why some situations are impossible to bring about whereas others are not. 
There is nothing in the past or presence that would explain why on the 10th of January 
2015 it will be impossible to accelerate a massive particle beyond c.  
 Given certain values for p and V why isn’t it possible to bring about any arbitrary 
value for T? It seems that on a Humean conception no reason can be provided why it 
does not at least sometimes happen that T1 ≠ T0 occurs after setting p to p0 and V to 
V0. If all events are entirely loose and separate it is difficult to see what explains the 
failure of success these situations whether in the case of the ideal gas, the speed of 
light or the perpetuum mobile.  
 Does what’s happened up to now, just by itself, in the actual world, place any 
modal constraints on what happens in the future? The Humean has to say: No. There 
are no modal facts in nature that constrain what happens nor what I can do.2 I can do 
anything (unless—maybe—if it is self-contradictory). This claim is not denied by 
Humeans. In fact it is sometimes explicitly endorsed to argue for the further claim that 
since laws don’t metaphysically constrain what we are able to do, we are free in a liber-
tarian sense even if determinism is true. Norman Swartz, for instance, explicitly holds: 
It is partly up to us to decide what the grand physical truths (physical laws) of the world are. 
(Swartz 2003, 126)3 
Interestingly Swartz acknowledges that there are limits to what we can do—that there 
are some situations we can bring about whereas we fail to bring about others even if 
we try hard. 
All sorts of physical laws seem to be quite outside my sphere of influence. I cannot (I have tried) 
cause a friend to regrow a severed leg by waving my hands. Nor can I choose that it is a grand 
physical truth that human beings have three sets of adult teeth. Experience has shown me that 
this is the sort of world in which these things are not up for grabs, that no amount of willing and 
trying on my part will bring about these desired effects. (Swartz 2003, 126) 
No explanation is given of why we can bring about some situations but not others. 
Swartz does not seem to consider this to be a problem for the Humean.  
 However, it seems that the Humean needs to give some account of why there is a 
difference between effects that we can bring about and others which we cannot bring 
about. I will now discuss two suggestions of how a Humean account of the recalci-
trance of nature might work. 
Suggestion 1:  
What the above considerations show is that if we simply assume any Humean mosaic 
there is no explanation for the failure of success of the envisaged intervention. But as 
in the case of explaining the success of our inductive inferences the Humean might  
                                                      
2 Humeans typically do hold that there are modal facts but they are conceived as derivative—as facts the 
supervene on/are constituted by the facts of the Humean mosaic.  
3 Similar views have been defended for example by Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele (2002) as well as by 
Marius Backmann (2013). 
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introduce a further constraint, namely regularity. So, what if the Humean mosaic is 
not chaotic but regular—a mosaic such that whenever p and V are set to p0 and V0 T0 
will occur? It seems that if the mosaic is regular the regularity-fact explains why we 
never bring about value combinations disallowed by the Boyle-Charles-law. It seems 
to explain—in some sense of ‘explain’—why we never accelerate particles beyond the 
speed of light and why there is no perpetuum mobile.  
 If “All Fs are Gs” is true then it is logically impossible for there to be a F that fails 
to be a G. Thus: Certain pVT-combinations occur and others don’t. That is all. And as 
a matter of fact what happens is regular. That is all there is to be explained. There is 
no need for modal connections.  
 I have one worry and two objections. The worry can be illustrated by an analogy. 
Suppose John and Lisa intended to marry. However, as a matter of fact they couldn’t. 
Why not? Well there is a complicated story about his and her parents, different social 
backgrounds and so on. There were insurmountable difficulties. Ok., but here is an-
other explanation: Given this experience John decided never to marry—he remained a 
bachelor. So why couldn’t Lisa and John marry? Well, John was—as a matter of 
fact—a bachelor. And it is logically impossible for a bachelor to have married. Is this 
second explanation a good explanation? It seems that there is something wrong with 
it. The fact that we can classify John as a bachelor is a consequence of this not having 
married—not the other way round. Even though it logically follows from John being a 
bachelor that he didn’t marry, this by itself is not an explanation of why he didn’t mar-
ry, let alone of why he couldn’t marry. The worry is that the Humean might make a 
similar mistake. It might be that the generality “All Fs are Gs” to which the Humean 
appeals, is true in virtue of facts that are left out of the Humean picture. 
Objection 1:  
While the worry concerns Humeanism in general, the objection to follow pertains to 
open-future-Humeans only. The open-future-Humean holds that while the past and 
the present are fixed, the future isn’t. It follows—and that is the essential point—that 
of now there is no regularity such as “All Fs are Gs”. It is not yet determined which 
timeless regularities will turn out to be true.  
 It has to be kept in mind that on a Humean view the world’s laws are fixed only 
when the world has come to an end. So, it is indeed true that if “All Fs are Gs” is true 
then it is logically impossible for there to be a F that fails to be a G. But whether the 
antecedent is true is not yet determined. Thus, whether there will be a timeless regular-
ity according to which certain pVT-combinations never occur or the speed of light 
will not be topped by massive particles is not yet determined. It depends among other 
things upon whether or not we are successfully bringing about certain situations. And 
what should there be in a Humean world that stops me to now accelerate a particle 
beyond the speed of light? According to the Humean there is nothing in the past and 
the present that makes it impossible to accelerate a particle beyond the speed of light 
or to build a perpetuum mobile. So the alleged explanation of why we can now bring 
about certain situations but not others in terms of timeless regularities does not work. 
It seems to put the cart before the horse: Given the Humean’s assumptions there are 
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no modal facts. There is nothing that can hinder me doing this or that. The regulari-
ties there are depend (at least in part) on what we are able to bring about. The open-
ness of the future undermines the explanation in question.  
Objection 2:  
There is a further objection one may raise against Humeans who appeal to the logical 
impossibility of bringing about an F that fails to be a G given the generalisation “All 
Fs are Gs” is true. The argument serves both to explain why it is impossible to accel-
erate particles beyond the speed of light and to explain why we cannot produce gold-
spheres of a certain size. But it seems obvious that there is a difference between the 
two cases: It would have been possible to produce gold-spheres that are larger than 
those that will have been produced at the end of the time.  
 This objection will probably fail to impress any Humean. Up to this point I have 
not taken into consideration that Humeans have a respectable account of lawhood, 
namely David Lewis’s best system-account. This account will certainly help to distin-
guish accidental regularities such as the case of the gold spheres from genuine laws 
such as claim that particles cannot be accelerated beyond the speed of light. According 
to Lewis’s best system account   
[A] contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in 
each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength. 
(Lewis 1973: 73) 
A generalization is a law if it is part of an ideal theory. The ideal theory in turn is de-
termined by (supervenes on) the entire Humean mosaic (past, present, future).  
 Does this account of lawhood help to dispel the second objection against sugges-
tion 1?  It may very well establish a difference between “No massive particle can be 
accelerated beyond the speed of light” and “No golden sphere has a diameter of more 
than 5m.” It may turn out (we don’t know yet) that the first is part of the ideal theory 
whereas the second isn’t. However, even if this works out, it remains true that if the 
recalcitrance of nature is explained according to suggestion 1 it works for both, the al-
leged law and the alleged accidental regularity. It works simply in virtue of both being 
generalisations. So if the account of Lewis is of any help with the recalcitrance-issue, 
the help must be of a different kind. I will now turn to the second suggestion of how 
to explain (away) the recalcitrance of nature. 
Suggestion 2:  
Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele acknowledge that the recalcitrance of nature poses a 
problem for the Humean.  
Fred is able to eat cake for breakfast tomorrow insofar as his doing so is consistent with his 
world's past (and the laws of logic), but also that he is able, in just the same sense, to move his 
arm faster than light, and to leap over Manchester Town Hall in a single bound. This is a legiti-
mate worry to have, because the Humean view does indeed have those consequences. (Beebee 
and Mele 2002, 212) 
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Their strategy to cope with this problem is to distinguish two modal claims. The first 
claim they hold to be true in virtue of metaphysical indeterminateness of the Humean 
mosaic: 
a) I can now (or on the 10th January 2015) accelerate particles beyond the speed of 
light.  
However, there is the closely related claim which, they argue, is false: 
b) If I were now (or on the 10th January 2015) to try to accelerate particles beyond 
the speed of light, I would succeed. 
 It is b)’s falsity that accounts for the (appearance of the) recalcitrance of nature. 
Why is b) false even though a) is true? The falsity of b) becomes apparent when we 
evaluate the counterfactual in terms of Lewis’ semantics. In order to evaluate the 
counterfactual according to Lewis’ semantics we have to consider the nearest (i.e. 
most similar) worlds in which I try to accelerate particles beyond the speed of light. 
We then have to figure out whether I would indeed succeed. The counterfactual is 
false if I fail to succeed in the nearest possible world. Since for Lewis sameness of 
laws is very important for spelling out the similarity relation (I will not go into any de-
tails here) and assuming that it is indeed a law in our world that nothing can be accel-
erated beyond the speed of light, we have to assume that it also holds in the nearest 
possible worlds. Thus it turns out to be false that I would succeed in in accelerating 
particles beyond the speed of light. This then explains the recalcitrance of nature: The 
counterfactual “I would succeed even if I tried hard” is false.  
 One advantage of suggestion 2 is that—in contrast to suggestion 1—it might allow 
to differentiate between the case of the gold-spheres and the case of the accelerated 
particles. In the nearest possible world in which I try to build to construct gold-
spheres that have a diameter of more than 5m, I might very well succeed in doing so. 
 However, I do have an objection to this line of argument that applies to the open-
future Humean and a worry that concerns Humeanism in general. The objection is 
this: According to the open-future-Humean the future facts are not yet fixed. There 
simply aren’t any future facts now. A fortiori—as mentioned above—it is not yet de-
termined what timeless regularities there will be. Of now it is not determined whether 
“All Fs are Gs” is true. It is therefore not yet determined which generalisations go into 
the competition for the best system. Thus, it is not yet determined which laws there 
are. It is for example premature to claim that “All gold spheres have a diameter of less 
than 50 m” will not be part of the ideal theory (assuming it is true of all gold spheres so 
far). It is simply not yet determined whether this will be an axiom or a theorem of the 
ideal theory. Since the truth-conditions of counterfactuals such as b) depend on what 
the laws are, the truth-conditions are not yet fixed. This is not an epistemological 
point. It might be true—assuming a regular humean mosaic—that what we consider 
to be true generalisations now will eventually prove to be genuine generalisations and 
it might therefore be true that we have already now a good grip on the best system. 
But still, for the open-future-Humean the future is open, i.e. future facts are not yet 
determined. A fortiori the best system is—as a matter of fact—not yet determined ei-
ther. For the open-future-Humean it is thus wrong to claim (at any point in time) that if 
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I were now to try to accelerate particles beyond the speed of light, I would fail to suc-
ceed. 
 The problem I have just outlined is a problem for the open-future-Humean only. 
It is not a problem for the eternalist because for the eternalist the laws are fixed and 
thus the truth-value of the counterfactual b) is fixed too. I do, however, have a worry 
concerning the humean eternalist’s explanation for why I am unable to accelerate a 
particle beyond the speed of light now. Ultimately the Humean answer for why nature 
is recalcitrant now has to appeal—via the laws and the best system—to the entire 
humean mosaic. The Humean thus explains a fact (my now not being able to succeed 
in what I want to do) partly in terms of future facts. The worry is that this does not 
accord well with our usual standards of what should go into an explanation. Future 
facts are not usually admitted to play the role of explanantia. It thus seems that the 
Humean eternalist changes the standards of explanation in accounting for the recalci-
trance of nature. 
5.  Conclusion 
What I hope to have shown is that the Humean conception has certain costs if the fu-
ture is taken to be open. It does not account for a distinction that is even acknowl-
edged by Humeans: We not merely happen not to bring about certain pVT-
combinations, rather we cannot bring them about. We have tried hard, but it did not 
work. There seems to be a difference between on the one hand trying hard to bring 
about a situation S and failing to do so and on the other hand by mere happenstance 
not to have brought about a situation S. The open future-Humean cannot explain the 
recalcitrance of nature. It seems she has to flatly deny that there is this difference and 
argue that this aspect of our experience of recalcitrance turns out to be merely appar-
ent in the light of Humeanism (see also Schrenk forthcoming). As a consequence the 
open-future-Humean has to deny that laws make claims not only about actual situa-
tions but also about possible and impossible situations. So it might be advisable for a 
humean to hold humean eternalism rather than open-future-Humeanism. But as I 
have indicated there might very well be problems with this position too. 
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